‘The Peacemaker’ Is a Warning to All

Thanks to the new action film, “The Peacemaker,” much of the American public will have its first encounter with post-Cold War nuclear terrorism. Although experts will quibble with the details of the film’s scenario, its basic premises are all too true: The former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and material stockpile is at risk, and America is extraordinarily vulnerable to terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction.

Until recently, most experts downplayed the risk of the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons from Russia’s vast arsenal. Earlier this month, however, Gen. Alexander T. Lebed claimed that more than 100 nuclear “suitcase bombs” were unaccounted for. In January 1996, I received a similar report from a senior advisor to President Boris Yeltsin. According to this individual, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the KGB acquired an unspecified number of small nuclear weapons (under 75 pounds) that never were included in any inventory.

Given these revelations, the possibility of a “Peacemaker”-style nuclear weapons seizure cannot be discounted. A more likely variety of nuclear theft, however, is the diversion of weapons-usable material from the hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium at dozens of sites throughout the former Soviet Union. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a significant quantity of this material is located outside of Russia in Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Especially worrisome because of its geographical location are three tons of plutonium at Aktau, Kazakhstan, on the Caspian Sea across from Iran. While there are plans to move this material to a more secure site, it currently is an inviting target for would-be proliferators and terrorists.

Also vulnerable to diversion are two separate caches of highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Iranian agents are known to have expressed interest in acquiring more than nine pounds of this uranium at the Tbilisi Institute of Physics. Although the United States has provided assistance to upgrade physical protection at the institute, it remains inadequately guarded.

An even more dire situation exists at the nuclear research facility in Sukhumi, Georgia, where several kilograms of highly enriched uranium are believed to be present without any international safeguards. The problem stems from the fact that the site is located on Abkhazian territory, a breakaway part of the republic not under Georgian control. According to Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy officials who recently were in contact with authorities at Sukhumi, no one knows how much uranium is at the war-ravaged site.

Fortunately, unlike the plot of “The Peacemaker,” there are no confirmed cases in which nuclear weapons or material from the former Soviet Union have found their way into the United States. Given the absence of reliable means to identify and interdict such imports, however, this fact is primarily a matter of good luck. Unless more concerted action is taken to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, our luck soon may run out.

The most urgent task is to shore up the security of nuclear weapons and material at their source. More than anything else, we must upgrade physical protection at nuclear facilities at a faster pace. At a time when Congress is poised to authorize billions of dollars for the purchase of more stealth bombers than the Air Force wants, one cannot afford cuts in crucial nonproliferation programs that directly support U.S. efforts to secure Russian nuclear material and warheads.

A useful step that the United States should take is to accelerate the implementation of the 1992 agreement to purchase 500 tons of surplus uranium from Russia. Washington also should attempt to buy all of the highly enriched uranium known to reside in the non-Russian successor states. Given the relatively small but militarily significant amount of material involved, this effort would be a low-cost, high-return nonproliferation strategy.

The U.S. has in place only bits and pieces of an effective policy to prevent the introduction or use of nuclear weapons within its borders. These existing programs are underfunded, poorly coordinated and do not cover the full spectrum of this immediate threat to U.S. national security.

We need to make controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and material a clear national priority. Otherwise, on the morning after the first nuclear terrorist attack on a U.S. city, our leaders will be hard pressed to explain what they did to prevent the catastrophe. Unlike a movie script, there will be no chance to rewrite the ending.